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Abstract 6 
When extreme weather events occur, people often turn to social media platforms to share 7 
information, opinions and experiences. One of the topics commonly discussed is the role 8 
climate change may or may not have played in influencing an event. Here, we examine 9 
Twitter posts that mentioned climate change in the context of three high-magnitude extreme 10 
weather events – Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and Snowstorm Jonas – in order to assess 11 
how the framing of the topic and the attention paid to it can vary between events. We also 12 
examine the role that contextual factors can play in shaping climate change coverage on the 13 
platform. We find that criticism of climate change denial dominated during Irene, while 14 
political and ideological struggle frames dominated during Sandy. Discourse during Jonas 15 
was, in contrast, more divided between posts about the scientific links between climate change 16 
and the events, and posts contesting climate science in general. The focus on political and 17 
ideological struggle frames during Sandy reflects the event’s occurrence at a time when the 18 
Occupy movement was active and the 2012 US Presidential Election was nearing. These 19 
factors, we suggest, also contributed to climate change being a more prominent discussion 20 
point during Sandy than during Irene or Jonas. The Jonas frames, meanwhile, hint at lesser 21 
public understanding of how climate change may influence cold weather events when 22 
compared with tropical storms. Overall, our findings demonstrate how event characteristics 23 
and short-term socio-political context can play a critical role in determining the lenses through 24 
which climate change is viewed. 25 
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Introduction 37 
 38 
In recent years, the East Coast of the United States has played host to a succession of high-39 
magnitude extreme weather events including Hurricane Irene in 2011, Hurricane Sandy in 40 
2012 and Snowstorm Jonas in 2016. While these events cannot be singularly attributed to 41 
climate change (1, 2), the apparent upswing in the frequency of large storms in the region is 42 
consistent with scientific expectations in a warming world (1, 3–7). Consequently, the storms 43 
have stimulated renewed debate on climate change amongst the American public and within 44 
the country’s media and political spheres. 45 
 46 
Changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather will likely be the most prominent, 47 
near-term way in which many people experience the effects of climate change (7–9). Several 48 
studies have suggested that personal experience of extreme weather events that are associated 49 
with climate change has the potential to boost climate change belief, risk perception, and 50 
willingness to act (10–14). Therefore, when they occur, such events represent politically 51 
important moments for those wishing to influence popular perceptions around climate 52 
change. They offer the opportunity to discuss one of the most significant effects of climate 53 
change – increasingly severe extreme weather – while public attention is high and while the 54 
science has an elevated newsworthiness. However, the extent and manner of influence on 55 
public perception will in large part depend on whether the links between extreme events and 56 
climate change enter the public consciousness, and on how the links are framed. 57 
 58 
 59 
Figure 1. Areas for which Major Disaster Declarations or Emergency Declarations were issued in relation to each 60 
event and the best track estimates for Irene and Sandy (15–17). As Jonas was an extratropical cyclone, its track was 61 
less clearly defined so a discrete best path estimate is not available. 62 
Television, newspaper, and radio outlets have traditionally been important meditators  of the 63 
climate change discourse (18), determining whether the potential connections between climate 64 
change and the events will be discussed, and how. This has historically made the so-called 65 
legacy media hugely influential when it comes to shaping public understanding of climate 66 
change and the new era of extreme weather that it may be ushering in. The supremacy of the 67 
legacy media as an arbitrator of news is, however, now being challenged by the rise of online 68 
social media with potentially important repercussions for coverage of climate change. Over 69 
the past decade, social media platforms have emerged as an alternative medium through 70 
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which people can access news and commentaries, and engage in debate. A 2016 Pew Research 71 
Center survey found that 62% of American adults now get news on social media sites, with 72 
18% doing so regularly (19). The growth of social media as a source of news means platforms 73 
like Facebook and Twitter are joining legacy media as important mediators of discourse on 74 
climate change. This may be especially true during extreme weather events when use of social 75 
media and interest in climate change tend to simultaneously spike (20). However, the 76 
implications of this are yet to be fully understood and the nature of social media discourse 77 
around climate change during times of extreme weather is yet to be thoroughly characterised. 78 
 79 
This paper makes a contribution to filling this gap in understanding by analysing Twitter 80 
posts that mentioned climate change in relation to Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and 81 
Snowstorm Jonas (see Fig. 1 for an overview of the areas affected; see SI Appendix A for 82 
descriptions of how each event may have been influenced by climate change). The study 83 
considers the prominence of climate change as a topic during each event; the spatial and 84 
temporal distribution of posts; and the ways in which the issue was framed. The potential 85 
implications of the findings for our understanding of public perceptions around the 86 
relationship between climate change and extreme weather are then discussed. Further details 87 
on each event are provided in the SI Appendix A. 88 
 89 
Background 90 
 91 
Extreme weather and climate change perception  92 
 93 
Despite the international scientific community repeatedly affirming the existence of climate 94 
change and warning of the significant impacts it may entail (21), only 48% of American adults 95 
believe climate change is mostly due to human activity, and a mere 36% say they care a great 96 
deal about the issue (22). This discrepancy between scientific understanding and public 97 
sentiment has motivated a range of studies looking into the factors that shape perceptions of 98 
climate change – factors that may help to explain such polling (23). Several papers have cited 99 
the sense that climate change is a distant and intangible phenomenon as perhaps being 100 
particularly important in curtailing concern (10, 24, 25). Intangibility and psychological 101 
distancing, it is argued, may assuage concern around climate change risks, while the former 102 
might also create scope for (erroneous) doubt about the very existence of global warming (10, 103 
23). 104 
 105 
Several studies have hypothesised that personal experience of climate change associated 106 
weather conditions – particularly weather extremes – might make climate change feel more 107 
visceral and less psychologically distant (10, 24, 26). It follows that after exposure to such 108 
events, climate change belief is likely to be strengthened and concern is likely to rise (25, 26). 109 
This, of course, assumes that people first make the link between the conditions they 110 
experience and climate change, and as Weber (25) notes, there is also the possibility that 111 
exposure without adverse consequences may lower perceptions of risk. A further caveat is 112 
that experiential learning processes tend to show a strong recency bias (25, 26). As Taylor et 113 
al. (26) explain, “experiencing a highly negative event increases its availability from memory, 114 
which in turn increases the perceived likelihood of its re-occurrence”. This can lead to 115 
overestimation of climate change risks following recent experiences and, conversely, 116 
underestimation once memories have faded (24–26). When there is a rapid succession of 117 
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extremes – as when Sandy struck the United States Northeast just a year after Irene struck the 118 
same region – the tendency to overestimate may be particularly high. 119 
 120 
The implication of the learning-from-experience theory is that by accentuating the links 121 
between climate change and events, such as Irene, Sandy and Jonas, it may be possible to 122 
better engage the affected populations with climate change issues and build support for 123 
mitigation and adaptation measures – at least while the events remain fresh in people’s minds 124 
(10). Indeed, a study by Rudman et al. (11) found that New Jersey residents were more likely 125 
to vote for pro-environmental politicians following Hurricane Irene and Hurricane Sandy, 126 
compared with before. This is important because the literature suggests there are few other 127 
ways of readily generating the popular support necessary to facilitate large scale collective 128 
action on the issue (25). However, there are also warnings in the literature as to how 129 
generating strong emotional responses can become counterproductive by overwhelming 130 
people, leading to defeatism, avoidant behaviour, denial and apathy (26). 131 
 132 
Evidence suggesting that personal experience of anomalous weather conditions can affect 133 
climate change perception is growing. Multiple studies in the United States have found a 134 
positive association (12–14, 27–29), as have several studies elsewhere in the world (10, 30, 31). 135 
However, extreme winter weather, such as Snowstorm Jonas, can be something of a 136 
complicating factor. A study by Shao and Goidel (32), looking at the effect of local weather 137 
conditions on climate belief in the Gulf Coast Region of the United States found that the 138 
downward trend in winter temperatures in recent years had negatively affected climate 139 
change belief. However, Capstick and Pidgeon, (30) in contrast, discovered that following a 140 
period of severe cold weather in the UK, three times as many people believed the event to be 141 
indicative of climate change than felt it to be disconfirming it. 142 
 143 
Besides psychological distancing and intangibility, it should be recognised that there are 144 
multiple other factors which can affect perception and therefore potentially offset, bolster or 145 
act in lieu of the influence of personal experience in shaping perceptions; for example, 146 
confirmation bias is believed to be prevalent (32). This refers to the tendency to interpreting 147 
new information in a way that aligns with pre-existing beliefs. Motivated reasoning is also 148 
known to be important (23, 25). Shao and Goidel (32), for instance, found that partisan 149 
affiliation had the strongest influence on perceptions of local weather along the United States 150 
Gulf Coast of any factor. They show that Democratic voters were not only more likely to be 151 
concerned about climate change than Republican voters in the region, but also more likely to 152 
perceive changes in the local climate, including changes in the frequency and intensity of 153 
hurricanes, droughts and floods (32).  154 
 155 
Given climate change may have contributed to the intensity of Irene, Sandy and Jonas, and 156 
given many of those who tweeted about the events were likely to have been residing in 157 
affected areas, the datasets explored in this paper are very probably reflective of the influence 158 
of personal experience. Similarly, other factors shaping interpretation of the events, such as 159 
the previously mentioned confirmation bias and motivated reasoning, are likely to be evident.  160 
 161 
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Twitter and climate change 162 
 163 
While the legacy media have traditionally been the focus of much of the scholarship around 164 
climate change communication, there is growing interest in the insights that data from Twitter 165 
can provide (33, 34). One of the most relevant studies in the context of this paper is a United 166 
States focussed investigation by Kirilenko et al. (20) that sought to establish whether personal 167 
experience of anomalous weather conditions affected engagement in climate change discourse 168 
on Twitter. They found that substantial local temperature anomalies did tend to result in a 169 
discernible increase in Twitter posts referring to climate change. The authors also identified 170 
significant spikes in tweeting activity during the timeframe of their data that corresponded to 171 
a number of high profile national and international climate change and weather-related 172 
events. The study did not, however, explore the nature of the climate change discourse, nor 173 
did it seek to examine specific events in depth. Sisco et al. (35) similarly used Twitter posts to 174 
examine the effect of various weather events that occurred in the United States on attention 175 
to climate change, assessing, in particular, the effect of different types of weather event. They 176 
found that a relatively wide range of weather events had detectable effects including coastal 177 
flooding, strong winds, excessive heat, droughts, extreme cold and heavy snow (35). 178 
 179 
An earlier paper by Kirilenko and Stepchenkova (36) conducted a more globally oriented 180 
investigation of climate change posts on Twitter. In addition to also finding that certain news 181 
events catalysed discussion around climate change, they discovered that the flow of 182 
information on Twitter tended to be highly centralised, with “few media outlets, celebrities, 183 
and prominent bloggers leading the debate” (36). Pearce et al. (37), meanwhile, studied Twitter 184 
dynamics in relation to the release of the IPCC Working Group 1 report, finding that users 185 
were more likely to make “conversational connections with those who broadly share their 186 
views on climate change” (37). This provides some weight to the idea that social media can 187 
sometimes act like an echo chamber, repeating and reinforcing peoples pre-existing beliefs 188 
due to the self-curated nature of users’ feeds. Williams et al. (38) similarly identified a 189 
tendency for users to interact with like-minded others, with polarised “sceptic” and “activist” 190 
communities forming as a result. However, as with Pearce et al. (37), they also found mixed-191 
attitude groups were present, though less common. 192 
 193 
Taking a different approach, Jang and Hart (39) examined how Twitter posts on climate 194 
change were framed, finding that within the United States, there was a particular tendency to 195 
“approach climate change issues in terms of whether global climate change is real or a lie” 196 
(39) – the “hoax” framing being much more frequently invoked than the “real” framing, 197 
especially in conservative leaning states. The study also found discussion around cause, 198 
impact, and solutions to be relatively niche. Jacques and Knox (40) also examined the frames 199 
through which climate change is viewed on Twitter, focusing very specifically on tweets 200 
posted during Hurricane Sandy that rejected the “orthodox climate consensus” – a topic 201 
highly pertinent to the study set out in this paper. The authors found that this rejection 202 
discourse largely drew on political rationale, rather than scientific rationale, and they further 203 
noted that the discourse tended to express certainty that climate science was a “wholesale 204 
fraud” (40).  205 
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 206 
Of additional note in the context of this study is research that has looked at the use of Twitter 207 
during other types of emergency event. An early study by Palen et al. (41), for example, 208 
examined the spatio-temporal distribution of Twitter posts during the 2009 Red River Valley 209 
floods which affected an area spanning the US-Canadian border. They found that the types of 210 
information shared about the event changed with distance from the affected area and showed 211 
that attention to the event is sustained over time primarily by those who are local to the event 212 
(41). In another crisis focused study, Bruns and Burgess (42) examined tweeting activity 213 
following the 2011 earthquake that struck Christchurch, New Zealand. They documented the 214 
role Twitter played in the disseminating information and noted how the rate of posting 215 
slowed over time. 216 
 217 
While the collective Twitter literature does provide a number of interesting insights into 218 
several facets of climate change discourse on Twitter, important gaps remain. In particular, 219 
there is a lack of knowledge about the particular nature of climate change discourse during 220 
extreme weather events. Few evaluations have so far been done of specific extreme weather 221 
events and where studies have been done, the focus has often been either on using the volume 222 
of Twitter posts as a proxy for attention paid to the subject or on exploring the dynamics of 223 
information flow. The content of climate change related tweets posted during extreme 224 
weather events has yet to be systematically explored. 225 
 226 
Changes to the Twitter ecosystem and society over time 227 
 228 
Less than two weeks after Irene dissipated (16), Twitter announced that its active user base 229 
had reached 100 million (43). Shortly after Sandy occurred, it announced that this figure had 230 
grown to 200 million (44) and by the time Jonas struck, the figure had risen yet further to 310 231 
million (45). However, much of this growth came from outside of the United States (46). A 232 
Pew Research Center survey found that in August 2011, 12% of American adults who were 233 
online used Twitter, by December 2012 this figure had risen to 16% and by early 2016 it had 234 
reached 24% (47) - growth that, while substantial, is some way below the platforms headline 235 
growth. 236 
 237 
In addition to changes in the size of the user base, analysis by Liu et al. (46) shows that the 238 
Twitter ecosystem also evolved in several other ways in the time between the events. In 239 
particular, there was a substantial rise in the median follower count; there was an increase in 240 
the rate of retweeting and a decline in replies; new tweeting conventions emerged; cross-241 
posting practices grew; spam and malicious behaviour became more prevalent; the platform 242 
was increasingly adopted by celebrities, companies and organisations; and there was a shift 243 
from desktop to mobile usage (46). Paralleling these changes, it is likely that there were also 244 
shifts in societal attitudes towards climate change and extreme weather (48) – shifts that the 245 
events themselves did not necessarily contribute to. Each of these changes affects the 246 
comparability of the datasets, though the precise nature of the affect cannot be readily 247 
determined. It is important, therefore, that the temporal context of the events is recognised 248 
when interpreting the results. 249 
 250 
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 251 
Materials and methods 252 
 253 
Data source. For each of the extreme weather events under consideration we collected 254 
datasets of related tweets along with their associated metadata. The Irene and Jonas datasets 255 
were gathered using the Twitter Streaming API in near real-time, while the Sandy tweets were 256 
acquired post hoc using Gnip’s Historical PowerTrack API. The latter tool provides paid-for 257 
access to the entire historical archive of public Twitter data and was necessary because the 258 
huge volume of Sandy related tweets that were posted as the storm made landfall exceeded 259 
our capacity to collect the complete population of posts using the Twitter Streaming API. 260 
 261 
The World Meteorological Organization’s practice of giving tropical cyclones short, 262 
distinctive names aids the identification of specific tropical cyclone events by keyword 263 
searches on Twitter as these names quickly become the predominant means by which 264 
individuals and organisations refer to the events. For Hurricane Irene, we therefore used the 265 
terms irene and hurricane as our keywords, while for Hurricane Sandy we simply used the 266 
term sandy. Traditionally, the tropical cyclone nomenclature has not been applied to other 267 
types of extreme weather system which makes identification of tweets citing non-tropical 268 
cyclone weather events more challenging. However, in recent years the Weather Channel (49) 269 
has begun unofficially naming major winter storms in the United States and a small number 270 
of winter storm related hashtags have gained prominence in the affected region. Together 271 
these developments aided our choice of keywords in the case of the January 2016 Winter 272 
Storm. We used The Weather Channel’s name for the event, jonas, along with the following 273 
hashtags: winterstormjonas, blizzard2016, stormjonas, snowzilla, jonasblizzard, snowmageddon, and 274 
snowpocalypse. 275 
 276 
For each dataset, visual inspection of samples indicates that the keywords predominantly 277 
returned true positives for the storms. A relatively small number of false positives were seen 278 
where our keywords represented a substring of a different word, where keywords were part 279 
of existing Twitter user names, and where the keywords were used in entirely different 280 
contexts. However, the infrequency of these cases and the subsequent methods used in the 281 
analysis means their impact on the overall results should be negligible. In each case, the 282 
datasets cover periods before, during, and after the storms passed over the East Coast of the 283 
United States. Table 1 provides details of the search periods and the number of posts returned.  284 
 285 
Table 1. Search period and tweets returned in the case of each event. 286 
Event Search period Tweets returned 
Irene 26 Aug 2011 – 12 Sep 2011 3.29 million 
Sandy 24 Oct 2012 – 5 Nov 2012 11.60 million 
Jonas 22 Jan 2016 – 30 Jan 2016 1.71 million 
 287 
Identification of climate change related posts. Once the event datasets were gathered, some 288 
basic cleaning was performed. This included removal of non-alphanumeric characters and 289 
URLs, conversion of all text to lowercase, and correction of common spelling mistakes. The 290 
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climate change related tweets contained within the datasets were then identified, using 291 
keyword matches as before. It was found that simply using the search terms climate change 292 
and global warming (with and without the space) resulted in a substantial number of false 293 
negatives. However, it was also found that broadening the search to also include any post 294 
containing the terms climate led to a substantial number of false positives. Consequently, a 295 
more sophisticated set of search rules was designed in which the terms climate or global had 296 
to occur along with one of a number of secondary terms for a match to be made – in some 297 
cases, these words needed to occur in order, while in other cases order did not matter (see 298 
Table 2). This approach appears to substantially reduce the overall number of false results. 299 
Pure substring matches were used to account for words being potentially concatenated in 300 
hashtags and to allow for a variety of potential suffixes. Throughout the paper, we refer to 301 
tweets identified using these rules as climate change tweets. 302 
 303 
Table 2. Search rules used to identify climate change related posts. The vertical bar is used to symbolise the or 304 
operator. 305 
The following terms can occur in any order: 
Term 1 Term 2 
climate 
chang|denial|denier|deny|carbon|connect|link|new normal|pearl 
harbour|science|scientist|sea level|sceptic|skeptic|wakeup call|wakeupcall|warming 
global cooling|warming 
The following terms must occur in the order specified, either with or without a space: 
Term 1 Term 2 
climate silence|crisis|action 
 306 
Basic data attributes. Once the climate change related tweets were extracted from the main 307 
event datasets, the basic attributes of the climate change posts were explored. Firstly, the 308 
relative composition of retweets to non-retweets was calculated both at an aggregate level and 309 
temporally. The retweets were identified through the presence of the character string “RT” at 310 
the start of posts. Secondly, the number of times each retweeted post was shared was 311 
analysed. This was done through calculating the frequency of occurrence of each unique 312 
string in the subset of posts previously identified as retweets. This means that only retweets 313 
made during the timeframe of the dataset are considered. It should be noted that modified 314 
retweets and retweets of retweets will be counted as distinct from unmodified retweets of the 315 
original as they will not return string matches. Thirdly, the number of unique users who 316 
posted tweets was calculated using the user IDs provided in the metadata. 317 
 318 
Spatial distribution of posts. The geographical origin of posts was also assessed by analysing 319 
the geolocation metadata that is included in the datasets. As providing geolocation data with 320 
posts is optional for users of the Twitter platform, this geolocation data is not available for all 321 
posts. In fact, less than 2% of the event posts are geotagged. Consequently, geolocation data 322 
is distinctly sparse for the Irene and Jonas climate change posts. Geographical analysis was 323 
therefore performed on the event datasets as a whole rather than being restricted to the subset 324 
of climate change posts. We assume that the spatial distribution of climate change posts will 325 
hold similarities with the spatial distribution of event posts, though a degree of deviation is 326 
likely. In order to assess the cumulative percentage of geotagged posts by distance from areas 327 
where Major Disaster Declarations were issued, shapefiles showing areas where Major 328 
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Disasters had been declared for each event were downloaded from the FEMA website (15) 329 
and merged. The distance of the geotagged posts from the merged shapefiles was then 330 
calculated. This was done with the aid of the ‘gBuffer’ function from the R package ‘rgeos’ 331 
(50) and the ‘over’ function from the R package ‘sp’ (51). 332 
 333 
Climate change discourse. The discourse in the climate change posts was explored using a 334 
method developed by O’Neill et al. (52) for assessing how climate change is framed in media 335 
reports. Climate change related posts that were retweeted sufficiently frequently as to 336 
collectively exceed 0.1% of total climate change related tweets were assessed against a frame 337 
coding schema and assigned to the frame category that best matched the content of the post. 338 
Twenty-four retweets met the threshold conditions for assessment in the case of Irene, sixty-339 
four in the case of Sandy, and ninety-six in the case of Jonas. The frame coding schema 340 
included eleven frames (see Table 3). These were derived, for the most part, from the schema 341 
set out in O’Neill et al. (52), although supplemental frames were added and the definitions of 342 
others were adjusted to better reflect the nature of the frames we identified in the datasets 343 
when piloting the schema (details of the alterations made are provided in SI Appendix B). The 344 
coding process followed the guidance provided in O’Neill et al. (52). Frames were 345 
independently assigned to posts by two coders who considered the presence (or absence) of 346 
narrative themes, quoted sources, user mentions, keywords, hashtags, metaphors and URLs. 347 
Where coders judged posts to be ambiguous after considering the presence or absence of these 348 
features, past tweets and the Twitter “bio” of the post’s author was also taken into 349 
consideration. In cases where ambiguity still remained after this, posts were assigned “NA” 350 
in the coding datasheet. After frames had been assigned to all of the posts, the two coders 351 
datasheets were compared with the initial inter-coder reliability assessed using Cohen’s 352 
kappa. This yielded a score of 0.891 which indicates substantial agreement. Where different 353 
codes were found to have been assigned to a post, coders discussed the reasoning behind their 354 
choice and agreed on a single principal code.  355 
 356 
Table 3. The climate change frames considered in the study (adapted from O’Neill, 2015, p.381). 357 
Frame Brief description 
Settled Science (SS) Focus on the broad expert consensus around the science of climate change. SS1: 
Affirming that the fundamental science of climate change is settled. SS2: Criticism of 
those promoting contrarian views. 
Extremes (EX) Emphasis on the links between climate change and extreme weather events. Climate 
change may lead to an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather 
events. Climate change may exacerbate the impacts of extreme weather events. 
Uncertain Science (US) The existence of climate change is not explicitly questioned, but uncertainty in the 
science, impacts, and solutions may be raised. Attribution claims are treated with 
scepticism. 
Contested Science (CS) Climate science is explicitly contested. The idea that climate change is occurring or is 
primarily driven by anthropogenic actions is challenged. The idea that climate change 
may be having an influence on the frequency or nature of extreme weather events is 
challenged. 
Political or Ideological 
Struggle (PIS) 
Links are made between climate change, the ongoing extreme weather events, and the 
happenings in the political and media spheres.  
Economic (E) Emphasis on the economic implications of climate change or climate change action. E1: 
The economic case for acting is made. Reference may be made to the cost of climate 
change exacerbated extreme weather. E2: Climate change mitigation and adaptation 
will be hugely expensive. Other issues should take priority. 
Role of Science (ROS) Focuses on the role science and scientists should play in society, rather than on the 
science itself. May also discuss transparency, science funding, and the role of scientists 
in raising awareness. 
Opportunity (O) Climate change as an opportunity. O1: Acting on climate change offers potential co-
benefits for society and the environment. O2: The impacts of climate change may 
themselves create new opportunities. 
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Morality and Ethics 
(ME) 
Moral, religious, or ethical arguments are invoked, either ME1: for action or ME2: for 
no action. 
Health (H) Focuses on the potential implications of climate change for human health. 
Security (S) Emphasis is placed on the risks climate change poses to human security. Issues around 
energy, water, and food security may be raised, as may mass migration. 
Unclear (UN) The principal frame cannot be determine with reasonable confidence or does not align 
with any of the above definitions. 
 358 
 359 
Results 360 
 361 
In all, the Irene dataset contains 3.29 million posts, the Sandy dataset contains 11.60 million 362 
posts and the Jonas dataset contains 1.71 million posts. Terms pertaining to climate change 363 
were identified in 6,286 of the Irene posts, 99,823 of the Sandy posts and 5,326 of the Jonas 364 
posts. The total number of users who posted about climate change was 6,000 in the case of 365 
Irene, 67,613 in the case of Sandy, and 4,520 in the case of Jonas. Of those who posted about 366 
climate change, 3.43% did so more than once in the case of Irene, 19.34% did so more than 367 
once in the case of Sandy, and 10.97% did so more than once in the case of Jonas. 368 
 369 
 370 
Figure 2. Cumulative percentage of geotagged posts by distance from areas where Major Disaster Declarations 371 
were issued. 372 
Spatial distribution of posts. The geographical origin of a small proportion of the event posts 373 
(~1%) is included in the post metadata. A total of 59.62% of the geotagged Irene posts, 45.80% 374 
of the geotagged Sandy posts and 76.28% of the geotagged Jonas posts have coordinates that 375 
lie within 10 kilometres of areas where Major Disasters were declared during the respective 376 
events (Fig. 2). This suggests that a large proportion of the tweets are likely to have been 377 
posted by people who personally experienced the storms, with interest being particularly 378 
localised to the affected areas in the case of Jonas and relatively widespread in the case of 379 
Sandy. 380 
 381 
Temporal dynamics of posts. The temporal dynamics of the climate change posts are shown 382 
in Fig. 3. The dashed line, t, represents the moment of the New Jersey landfall in the case of 383 
Irene and Sandy, and the approximate midpoint of the snowfall over the Atlantic states in the 384 
case of Jonas. The average hourly number of climate change posts prior to t was 24.25 for 385 
Irene, 113.39 for Sandy and 76.86 for Jonas. Over the 72-hour period following t, the average 386 
climbed to 68.22 for Irene and 938.88 for Sandy but fell to 32.29 for Jonas – very substantial 387 
shifts in each instance. The proportion of event posts that the climate change tweets 388 
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constituted also varied over time, with the relative significance of climate change as a 389 
discussion point increasing after t in each instance. Prior to t, climate change posts constituted 390 
0.07% of all Irene posts, 0.26% of all Sandy posts and 0.30% of all Jonas posts, while after t the 391 
figures rose to 0.38%, 1.16% and 0.35% respectively. Notably, these averages mask numerous 392 
short-lived fluctuations, the most dramatic of which are driven by the retweeting of particular 393 
posts rather than by surges in the creation of original content. 394 
 395 
 396 
Figure 3. The leftmost charts show the absolute frequency of posts that mentioned climate change during each 397 
event on an hourly basis, while the rightmost charts show the proportion of all posts during each hour that 398 
mentioned climate change. The dashed line, t, represents the moment of the New Jersey landfall in the case of Irene 399 
and Sandy, and the approximate midpoint of the snowfall over the Atlantic states in the case of Jonas. Dates and 400 
times are in accordance with the Eastern Time Zone. 401 
Retweets. On Twitter, re-posted tweets are known as retweets. The practice of retweeting is 402 
commonly employed by users to share with their own followers a tweet that another user has 403 
posted. Such posts constitute 76.2% of the Irene climate change tweets, 54.9% of the Sandy 404 
climate change tweets, and 66.8% of the Jonas climate change tweets. The proportion of posts 405 
that are retweets in the unfiltered Sandy and Jonas datasets is slightly lower at 48.9% and 406 
64.9% respectively. However, in the case of Irene, the difference in retweeting rates between 407 
the unfiltered dataset and the climate change subset is very substantial as only 29.5% of the 408 
posts in the unfiltered Irene dataset are retweets. As Fig. 4 shows, the distribution of retweets 409 
across climate change posts is heavily skewed, with a long-tail – a small proportion of the 410 
posts attracted a large proportion of the retweets. The unequal distribution is particularly 411 
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pronounced in the case of Irene with retweets of a single post ultimately constituting 57.8% of 412 
the entire climate change posts. 413 
 414 
 415 
Figure 4. Number of times the top twenty climate change retweets from each event were shared, ordered by 416 
frequency. 417 
Frames invoked in the most frequently retweeted posts. In order to identify the main frames 418 
through which climate change was viewed during the events, we assessed the most frequently 419 
retweeted climate change posts in each dataset against a frame coding schema (Table 3) and 420 
assigned each post to the frame that best matched the content of the post (see Materials and 421 
Methods for more detail). As the assessed posts constituted a substantial portion of the total 422 
climate change posts – 67.47% in the case of Irene, 20.46% in the case of Sandy and 57.04% in 423 
the case of Jonas – the findings provide a good sense of the frames through which many users 424 
will have viewed the topic. 425 
 426 
As illustrated in Fig. 5, each dataset is characterised by notably different principal climate 427 
change frames. For Irene, the retweet discourse was dominated by a post that engaged in 428 
criticism of climate change denial and affirmed the existence of climate change (SS2). This post 429 
also had a secondary frame of a political dimension, as it specifically cited a Republican 430 
politician known for having described climate change as a “hoax”. In the case of Sandy, 431 
meanwhile, the political or ideological struggle frame (PIS) was the most prevalent. Many of 432 
the posts that fall within this frame referred to the 2012 presidential campaign which was 433 
drawing towards a conclusion around the time that Sandy struck. Criticism of the media was 434 
also a common theme within the PIS frame. In particular, a perceived lack of airtime and 435 
column inches given to the topic of climate change when Hurricane Sandy and the 436 
Presidential Election were being discussed was frequently raised as an issue. Criticism of 437 
those promoting contrarian views (SS2) and posts emphasising the links between climate 438 
change and extreme weather events (EX) also had a notable presence. In the case of Jonas, two 439 
frames were dominant, rather than one. Marginally leading the way in total retweets was the 440 
extremes frame (EX), with many of the posts highlighting the ways in which climate change 441 
could exacerbate snowstorms such as Jonas. The second frame, however, was the contested 442 
science frame (CS). The posts that fell within this category tended to cite the snowstorm as 443 
evidence that climate change was not occurring.  444 
 445 
Only one of the retweets we considered appealed directly to economic arguments (E). Posted 446 
during Irene, it raised concerns about damages that will be incurred from increasingly intense 447 
storms. Notably, none of the retweets that met our consideration threshold invoked health 448 
(H), morality and ethics (ME), opportunity (O) or role of science (ROS) as principal frames. 449 
 450 
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 451 
Figure 5. The total number of retweets by principal frame used in the original posts. Only the frames that were 452 
identified within the posts are included in the charts. 453 
Discussion 454 
 455 
The overall attention that each event drew on Twitter appears to reflect, at least in part, the 456 
socio-economic impact the storms had in the Northeastern region of the United States. Sandy 457 
caused the greatest damage, resulted in the most fatalities and attracted the most posts, while 458 
Jonas caused the least damage, resulted in the fewest fatalities and attracted the fewest posts 459 
(53, 54). Irene, meanwhile, lay somewhere in between on each count (55). These differences in 460 
the overall impact of the events are likely to have contributed to the differing number of 461 
climate change tweets posted during each storm. However, discrepancies in the proportion of 462 
posts that mention climate change across the events suggest other factors were also important 463 
in determining the attention paid to the topic. Sandy, in particular, stands out with 0.86% of 464 
all event posts mentioning climate change – a figure far in excess of the 0.19% of Irene posts 465 
and 0.31% of Jonas posts that raised the subject. The depth of user engagement in talking 466 
about climate change is also somewhat greater in the case of Sandy, with more users posting 467 
multiple climate change tweets. 468 
 469 
Sandy. The politically charged context in which Sandy occurred seems to have been an 470 
important factor in spurring much of the attention paid to climate change during the event. 471 
The Occupy movement, which began shortly after Irene had struck in 2011, was well 472 
established by the time Sandy rode up the East Coast and the United States presidential 473 
election of 2012 was drawing to a climax – election day was the 6 November, while the storm 474 
made landfall on the evening of 29 October.  The most frequently retweeted post was written 475 
by @YourAnonNews, an account controlled by the hactivist group Anonymous – a group that 476 
was closely entwined with the Occupy movement at the time. The post implied links between 477 
the storm and climate change, while arguing that climate change was not being adequately 478 
discussed in the public and political spheres. The second most retweeted post was written by 479 
Al Gore, the former Vice President of the United States and prominent environmentalist. He 480 
called for people to work together to “solve the climate crisis,” stating that “Sandy is a 481 
warning”. Common topics in the other widely retweeted posts included the perceived lack of 482 
media coverage of the climate change issue, its lack of prominence in the election campaigns, 483 
and the endorsement of Barack Obama by the then Mayor of New York City because of the 484 
president’s support for action on climate change. Although some of these posts represented 485 
little more than news reports, a substantial number of them seem to have been implicitly or 486 
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explicitly using Sandy as a means to push climate change up the political agenda and to raise 487 
public consciousness of the issue. 488 
 489 
Notably, the news outlets that have traditionally been influential in shaping the popular 490 
discourse in the United States were among the most frequently retweeted and referenced 491 
during Sandy. Among the 30 most retweeted climate change posts in the Sandy dataset were 492 
tweets from NBC News,1 CBS News, Time, the New York Times, and then CNN host, Piers 493 
Morgan (see SI Appendix C2). This demonstrates, as Bruns and Burgess (56) note, that Twitter 494 
is not separate from, but increasingly embedded into the larger media landscape, 495 
complementing rather than replacing traditional information sources. Interestingly, during 496 
Irene and Jonas, traditional mainstream news outlets were much less prominent. This was 497 
typically because they were not posting about climate change in relation to the events, rather 498 
than because they were not being retweeted. Seventeen tweets linking Sandy to climate 499 
change were identified as having been posted by major newspapers2 from the Northeastern 500 
United States. The number was just four in the case of Irene and zero in the case of Jonas. 501 
Lower profile groups and non-affiliated individuals were therefore more important in driving 502 
climate change discussion during Irene and Jonas. 503 
 504 
As previously mentioned, discussion of climate change within the Sandy dataset increased 505 
dramatically in both relative and absolute terms following the storm’s New Jersey landfall – 506 
an increase which was largely sustained in the days immediately afterwards. This indicates 507 
that landfall was something of a catalyst for climate change discussion and it shows that 508 
climate change as a discussion point had greater longevity than many other discussion points. 509 
This relatively greater longevity, we hypothesise, was because climate change discussions 510 
were largely a product of reflection on the meaning and implications of the event. To a degree, 511 
this theory also holds for Irene and Jonas. In both absolute and relative terms, climate change 512 
posts increased after Irene’s New Jersey landfall, although much of this was down to a single 513 
post. While climate change posts only increased in relative terms following Jonas, many of the 514 
Jonas posts that did not fall under the contested science (CS) frame were posted after the 515 
midpoint of the event. 516 
 517 
Irene. In both absolute and relative terms, there were substantially fewer posts pertaining to 518 
climate change within the Irene dataset, compared to the Sandy dataset – this despite both 519 
storms being tropical cyclones and both making landfall in the Northeastern United States 520 
within 430 days of one another. Several factors may have contributed to this. Firstly, the storm 521 
occurred during a less politically charged period. Secondly, while Irene caused substantial 522 
damage and disruption in places, its overall impact was not as historically notable as Sandy’s. 523 
We therefore speculate that it may not have been regarded as so historically anomalous and 524 
therefore suggestive of climate change. Thirdly, given major tropical cyclone landfalls are 525 
relatively unusual in the Northeastern United States, Sandy had the additional notability over 526 
Irene of having occurred so soon after another major storm. Fourthly, discussion of climate 527 
change during Sandy was boosted by numerous high-profile public figures speaking out on 528 
the issue. For example, posts by Al Gore, Ian Somerhalder, Ricky Gervais and Naomi Klein 529 
were all widely retweeted. Similarly, statements by the likes of the Mayor of New York City 530 
and articles by news organisations and campaign groups helped draw attention to the subject 531 
                                                     
1 Under the handle: @BreakingNews. 
2 Major newspapers are defined here as newspapers with a circulation of 250,000+. The accounts included in the 
analysis were restricted to the principal news and science accounts used by the newspapers. These were: @wsj, 
@wsjscience, @nytimes, @nytscience, @usatoday, @nydailynews, @newyorkpost, @washingtonpost, 
@posthealthsci, @newsday, @starledger, @phillyinquirer, @bostonglobe and @globedatadesk. 
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as evidenced by their presence in the lists of top retweets (see SI Appendix C2). Much of this 532 
was lacking during Irene. Growth in Twitter’s user base in the time between Irene and Sandy 533 
is also likely to have swelled the number of posts in the latter case – the number of online 534 
adults using Twitter in the United States increased by 33% between August 2011 and 535 
December 2012 (47). However, this user base growth cannot explain the greater relative 536 
importance of the climate change topic in the Sandy dataset. 537 
 538 
Another notable difference between the Irene and Sandy climate change data is that the Irene 539 
data is characterised by proportionally greater numbers of retweets and fewer examples of 540 
multiple postings by users – features that point to lesser user engagement in the topic of 541 
climate change. Consequently, not only did Sandy generate broader interest in the subject, it 542 
also seems to have generated deeper interest. The post that dominates the retweets in the Irene 543 
climate change data shares an affinity with the political and ideological frame that 544 
characterises many of the Sandy posts, even though its primary focus is on criticising climate 545 
change denial. However, other frames noted in the Sandy and Jonas tweets are notable only 546 
by their relative or absolute absence from the top Irene retweets. 547 
 548 
Jonas. Like Irene, Jonas attracted far fewer climate change tweets than Sandy did, both in 549 
absolute and relative terms. The gulf in the number of posts is especially large if growth in 550 
the user base is considered – the number of online adults in the United States using Twitter 551 
grew by 50% in the interval between Sandy and Jonas. However, in relative terms, climate 552 
change was a more prominent topic within the Jonas dataset when compared with the Irene 553 
dataset. This may be partially explained by larger numbers of climate change sceptics posting 554 
on the topic during Jonas than in the case of Irene. As individuals and groups concerned with 555 
climate change were also active, the posts by sceptics served to bolster the total number of 556 
climate change posts. While Jonas occurred in a presidential election year like Sandy did, it 557 
struck earlier in the campaign cycle. Reflecting this, the election campaigns did not feature 558 
prominently in the posts. The Occupy movement had also waned in the time since Sandy. 559 
Notably, the Jonas climate change posts also contained few references to the Paris climate 560 
accord which was adopted just a month prior to the storm. “Paris” was mentioned in just 561 
0.19% of the climate change posts. Indeed, contextual references to contemporary socio-562 
political events were less common in the Jonas climate change posts than in the other event 563 
datasets. 564 
 565 
The two main framings seen in the Jonas retweets – the extremes frame (EX) and the contested 566 
science frame (CS) – are distinct from those seen in the Irene and Sandy retweets. The greater 567 
presence of the contested science frame in the Jonas posts is unsurprising given extreme cold 568 
weather events are not likely to fit with many people’s image of what might be expected to 569 
happen in a warming world. Consistent with previous research (40), we find that the posts 570 
contesting climate science typically expressed certainty that anthropogenic climate change is 571 
a hoax and we find that such posts tended to focus on politics rather than science. Indeed, 572 
many of them utilised hashtags associated with right wing groups (e.g. #RedNationRising 573 
and #TCOT) and characterised those who believe in climate change as liberals while invoking 574 
contemptuous language (see SI Appendix C3). This indicates that the authors of these posts 575 
view climate change at least in part as a left-wing machination. In this respect, the political or 576 
ideological struggle frame (PIS) may be considered an important secondary frame. Notably, 577 
these posts tend not to explain why they cite Jonas as evidence against climate change. These 578 
reasons must be inferred by the reader which indicates that the authors assume their logic 579 
will be intuitively obvious to their audience. By contrast, the extremes (EX) frame posts were 580 
very much focused on articulating the scientific links between Jonas and climate change. We 581 
suggest that by sharing these posts users hoped to inform others of the possible links between 582 
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climate change and the storm, recognising that potential links between climate change and 583 
cold weather events are not necessarily intuitive or well-known. Users may also have wanted 584 
to close down speculation that Jonas disproved climate change. That the extremes (EX) frame 585 
was, in relative terms, used less frequently in the case of Irene and Sandy suggests the links 586 
between climate change and tropical cyclones are thought to be better known and therefore 587 
in less need of articulating. 588 
 589 
Given Jang and Hart (39) found that hoax frames typically prevail in the Twitter discourse 590 
within the United States, the parity of hoax and non-hoax frames during Jonas and the 591 
dominance of non-hoax frames during Irene and Sandy, represents a departure from the 592 
norm. It suggests that extreme weather events not only increase the profile of climate change 593 
as a topic on Twitter, they tangibly alter the balance of frames used to discuss the issue, at 594 
least for a short while. The relative absence of the political or ideological struggle (PIS) frame 595 
and relative lack of criticism of those promoting contrarian views (SS2) is notable in the Jonas 596 
data. One of the consequences of this is that the adversarial language invoked during Irene 597 
and Sandy by supporters of action on climate change has largely been replaced by factual 598 
argument. This, we suggest, may reflect a belief that factual argument is needed to contest 599 
climate change denial when seemingly counterintuitive evidence is encountered and used to 600 
contest the science. 601 
 602 
 603 
Conclusions 604 
 605 
In this study, we examined the nature of climate change discussions on Twitter during 606 
Hurricane Irene, Hurricane Sandy and Snowstorm Jonas. We found that the degree of 607 
attention the topic received varied, both in absolute and relative terms, between the events. 608 
Furthermore, the way the topic tended to be framed also differed in each case. 609 
 610 
When the growth of the Twitter user base is accounted for, it is clear that Sandy garnered by 611 
far the greatest attention, followed at a distance by Irene and then Jonas. This sequence reflects 612 
the relative socio-economic impact each storm had in the Northeastern region of the United 613 
States. However, the magnitude of the difference between Irene and Sandy in terms of climate 614 
change posts is more than would be expected based on impact alone. Instead, it seems that 615 
the socio-political context in which the Sandy occurred helped draw particularly substantial 616 
attention to the topic. That said, factors such as the storms exceptional size (57) and its ranking 617 
as the second-costliest cyclone to hit the United States since 1990 (17) will likely also have 618 
contributed to the tweet tally. The role the mainstream media played in focusing attention on 619 
the subject during Sandy appears to have been important as well. Several news outlets posted 620 
tweets that were widely shared, and content that news outlets posted elsewhere on the 621 
internet was also frequently cited – something which points to the continued importance of 622 
the legacy media. During Irene and Jonas, few mainstream news outlets posted on the subject. 623 
While this may help explain the smaller number of climate change posts the events generated 624 
in both relative and absolute terms, it is notable that thousands of tweets were still posted on 625 
the topic in each case. This shows how non-traditional actors are still able to give the issue 626 
voice through posting on the platform. 627 
 628 
In respect to frames, we found that the meteorological characteristics of the storms and the 629 
socio-political context in which they occurred both played an important role in shaping the 630 
lenses through which climate change was viewed during each event. Particularly notable was 631 
the relative absence of the contested science (CS) and uncertain science (US) frames within the 632 
top Irene and Sandy retweets given that hoax frames have been found to normally prevail in 633 
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the Twitter discourse within the United States (39). Even during Jonas, the contested science 634 
(CS) frame trailed behind the extremes (EX) frame. This suggests that extreme weather events 635 
cause a substantial shift in the balance of climate change coverage on Twitter towards non-636 
hoax perspectives.  637 
 638 
An important caveat to our findings is that the events we have considered occurred at 639 
different points over a four-and-a-half-year period. As we discuss in greater depth earlier, 640 
both the Twitter ecosystem and societal attitudes towards climate change evolved over this 641 
period with implications for the comparability of the events. Consequently, it is important to 642 
recognise the events as situated in time. With this in mind, we recommend that future studies 643 
consider how the frames used in climate change posts have changed over the years. We also 644 
suggest research be done to assess whether extreme weather events have a discernible lasting 645 
impact on the frames used to discuss the topic. 646 
 647 
As Weber and Stern note (58), accurate or not, media reports have the capacity to influence 648 
people’s thoughts and feelings. Although they were referring to traditional media reports, 649 
what they say is also applicable to social media posts – a 2016 Pew Research Center survey 650 
found that 20% of social media users in the United States had changed their views on a 651 
political or social issue because of something they saw on social media (47). This makes the 652 
rise in the number of posts expressing concern about climate change during extreme weather 653 
events important. The more posts there are that express concern, the more people are likely 654 
to see them, and so the greater the potential for building support for action on the issue. Even 655 
if the posts do not influence the views of other users, the elevated profile they give to the issue 656 
can still be politically important and can feedback into future coverage of extreme weather 657 
events through raising awareness of potential links between weather extremes and climate 658 
change. 659 
 660 
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